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Freeing the Telephone Company Seven:
The Justice Department Joins

the Chorus
by JAMES P. DENVIR
Following the submission of my previous article,' the Justice
Department (Department) transmitted its recommendations
concerning the AT&T consent decree's line-of-business restrictionS2 to the district court. These recommendations greatly
overshadowed the subject ostensibly addressed by the article
and its companions3'the Dole Bill's proposed transfer of juris-.
diction over the consent decree from the United States district
court to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or
Commission). 4 My commentary noted that the Justice Department's support for the Dole Bill seemed to reflect greater ambivalence regarding the line-of-business restrictions than was
true in the past.5 It suggested that this shift was a result,
among other things, of the Department's diminished confidence within the Department in its own competence and that
of the judiciary to administer a set of regulations with broad
policy significance. It also appeared to be the result of a parallel enhanced estimation of the ability of regulatory methods to
deal comprehensively with the difficult competitive problems
presented by the Bell Operating Companies' (BOC's) control
1. Denvir, The Dole Bilk Freeing The Telephone Company Seven? 9 CoMM/ENT
L.J. 113 (1986).
2. Report and Recommendations of the United States Concerning the Line of
Business Restrictions Imposed on the Bell Operating Companies by the Modification
of Final Judgment (filed Feb. 2, 1987) United States v. Western Elec. Co., Civil Action
No. 82-0192 (D.D.C.) [hereinafter DOJ Report].
3. Worthington, The Case for Continued JudicialEnforcement of the AT&T Decree, 9 CoMM/ENT L.J. 75 (1986); McKenna & Slyter, The Modification of Final
Judgement: An Exercise in Judicial Overkill, 9 COMM/ENT L.J. 9 (1986).
4. S. 2565, 99th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1986).
5. Denvir, supra note 1, at 123.
6. The AT&T consent decree required, inter alia, that AT&T divest itself of the
Bell Operating Companies, which prior to divestiture provided all intrastate telephone services, both local and long distance. See United States v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460
U.S. 1001 (1983) (hereinafter AT&TI. The actual decree is appended to the AT&T
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of bottleneck local exchange facilities. 7
In view of the Department's recommendations to the court,
these observations must now seem masterpieces of understatement. The Department recommended, in short, that all of the
restrictions on the BOCs be lifted,8 except that the BOCs
should continue to be restricted from originating or terminating interexchange telecommunications within their own territories unless they fulfill certain conditions relating to the
lifting of state restrictions on intraexchange competition.9
While the articles by John Worthington of MCI and Robert
McKenna and Ronald Slyter of US WEST addressed the narrow jurisdictional questions raised by the Dole Bill, they also,
perhaps presciently, focused directly on key questions raised by
the DOJ Report. As would be expected, the two industry articles took opposite sides on the central question raised by the
Department's recommendations-the continued viability of judicial restrictions on BOC entry into lines of business closely
related to the BOCs' basic exchange telecommunications
functions.
The US WEST piece theorizes that the line-of-business restrictions were, from their inception, "unwise, anticompetitive,
and unnecessarily duplicative of the present statutory authority of the FCC."'10 Some of the points raised in support of this
proposition are unexceptionable. For example, it is clearly true
that the court's jurisdiction under the decree largely overlaps
that of the FCC." It is also true that the current procedures for
obtaining waivers to engage in non-exchange dependent businesses are probably more time consuming and burdensome
opinion, 552 F. Supp. at 232 [hereinafter MFJ]. The decree also imposed restrictions
on the businesses in which the BOCs may engage. Of principal significance are the

restrictions on BOC manufacture of telecommunications equipment and on BOC provision of information services and interexchange telecommunications. MFJ, 552 F.
Supp. at 189-91.
7. The basic theory of the AT&T case rested on the BOCs' monopoly control of
local switching and transmission facilities. The monopoly character of those facilities,
according to the theory, gave the BOCs the ability to disadvantage competitors who
must have access to such facilities to reach their customers. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at
160-63.
8. DOJ Report, supra note 2, at 6-7.
9. The Report recommends that the interexchange restriction be lifted completely only if state commissions remove all legal barriers to intrastate (including local) competition, permit unlimited resale and sharing of local services, eliminate price
discrimination, and afford access to conduit and telephone poles. Id. at 97-103.
10. McKenna & Slyter, supra note 3, at 12.
11. Id. at 42-56.
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than they need be, particularly in view of the experience of the
Department and the court in administering that process over
the past three years.12
Neither of those propositions will likely be the subject of serious controversy as the district court considers the Department's recommendations. Rather, the court will probably focus
on whether the basic premises on which the line-of-business restrictions were constructed remain viable: (1) whether the
BOCs' local exchange operations continue to possess monopoly
power; (2) whether the incentives and ability to engage in anticompetitive conduct conferred by that monopoly power have
significantly changed; (3) whether government regulation is capable of restraining use of monopoly power by means short of
entry restrictions; and (4) whether the costs of continuing to
impose the restrictions now exceed the benefits. 3
On these points the US WEST and MCI articles are dramatically opposed. In MCI's view, the restrictions were justified
when imposed and remain so today. The integration of local
monopolies into related, competitive businesses by the BOCs
would create precisely the incentives and opportunities for an-4
ticompetitive conduct the AT&T case was brought to redress.1
Further, the Justice Department was right the first time, when
it argued that "[p]articularly in a technologically dynamic industry such as telecommunications, there is little possibility
that regulation is capable of detecting or preventing the very
subtle forms of discrimination that would be available to the
BOCs."' Finally, there have been no changes that undercut
the original rationale for the restrictions.'6
US WEST argues that the basic premises of the line-of-business restrictions never had any basis in reality. According to
12. Id. at 56-58.
13. Section VIII(c) of the MFJ, which governs removal of the restrictions, allows,
on its face, consideration of only competitive interests. MFJ, 552 F.Supp. at 234. The
court, however, has previously taken into account factors other than purely competitive considerations in ruling on previous waiver requests. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 592 F.Supp. 846 (D.D.C. 1984). Further, the court has authority to grant
modifications of the decree under the Swift "new and unforeseen conditions" standard. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
14. Worthington, supra note 3, at 77-78.
15. Id. at 79 (quoting Response of The United States to Public Comments on Proposed Modification of Final Judgment, United States v. Western Elec. Co. (AT&T),
552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) (No. 82-0192), 47 Fed. Reg. 23,320, 23,335 (1982) [hereinafter Response of United States]).
16. Worthington, supra note 3, at 100 n.123.
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US WEST, there is no separate local exchange market, 7 nor
any monopoly power in the local exchange."8 Further, the restrictions, from the outset, were "predicated on the entirely erroneous assumption that regulators are either unwilling or
incapable of dealing with the modern telecommunications marketplace."'1 Moreover, US WEST claims the FCC either already has in place the means of addressing the competitive
problems treated by the decree, or is fully capable of doing so.
As to interexchange services, for example, US WEST notes
that the FCC has authority to regulate prices of interstate service and the "prices, terms, and conditions of interstate access." ° While the FCC does not have direct authority over
carrier manufacturing, it does have authority to examine supplier contracts and can disallow imprudent expenditures. 21 Finally, in its Computer Inquiry proceedings, the Commission
has developed and continued to refine an elaborate regulatory
structure to govern the participation of carriers in enhanced
service markets. 22 In the latest phase of those proceedings, the
FCC abandoned its previous structural separation requirements and substituted a requirement that the BOCs implement
a concept called Open Network Architecture (ONA), as a condition to providing enhanced services.2 3 With these tools, according to US WEST, the FCC has greater ability than both the
17. McKenna & Slyter, supra note 3, at 65.
18. Id. at 68.
19. Id. at 27.
20. Id. at 43.
21. Id. at 46.
22. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
(Second Computer Inquiry), Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980), modified 84 F.C.C.
2d 50 (1980), further modified, 88 F.C.C.2d 512 (1981), affd sub nom. Computer &
Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 938 (1983), further modified, FCC 84-190, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 301 (released
May 4, 1984); Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rule and Regulations
(Third Computer Inquiry), Report and Order in Docket No. 85-229, FCC 86-252, 60
Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 683 (released June 16, 1986) [hereinafter Computer III Report and
Order].
23. Computer Iff Report and Order, 60 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) para. 100 at 642.
Under the Computer II rules, the BOCs were required to provide enhanced services
only through subsidiaries separate from the telephone operating companies. See FCC,
Furnishing Enhanced Services and Customer-Premises Equipment, 47 C.F.R. § 64.702
(1985). Computer III abandoned the separate subsidiary requirement on the condition
that the BOCs implement a highly unbundled form of exchange access (ONA) that
would provide information service providers access to local exchange functions and
services comparable in technical quality and cost to those used in the BOCs' provision
of enhanced services. Computer III Report and Order, 60 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) para.
100 at 642.
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Justice Department and the district court to deal flexibly
and efficiently with problems of cross-subsidization and
discrimination.2
The MCI and US WEST commentaries thus stake out the extremes of the debate before the decree court. MCI takes the
position, similar to that of the Justice Department in its original decree to the court, that the competitive dangers of vertical
integration by the BOC's are sufficiently great to bar all entry.
Meanwhile, US WEST argues that no restrictions are justified.
While it is impossible to predict with certainty the course of the
decree court's analysis or its results, it seems likely that the
court will steer a course somewhere between the extremes reflected in the MCI and US WEST articles.
As US WEST correctly points out, for example, the court has
already rejected the "strict quarantine" approach advocated initially by the Justice Department and suggested by MCI's analysis. 25 It thus seems unlikely that the court will continue the
restrictions based solely on antitrust theory, even as augmented
by the substantial record of the AT&T case. On the other hand,
it seems equally unlikely that the court will accept US WEST's
argument that the restrictions were mistaken from the start
and that regulation is sufficient to fully safeguard the competitive interests the restrictions were imposed to protect. Rather,
as suggested above, the court will more likely return to the basic premises of the entry restrictions and examine their continued applicability to the industry three years after divestiture.
The following discussion briefly examines these premises and
offers some thoughts on how the court might view them in the
context of the industry post-divestiture.

I
Monopoly Power
As mentioned above, US WEST contends that exchange telecommunications does not constitute a separate market for purposes of antitrust analysis and that, even if it did, the BOCs
enjoy no monopoly power in that market.
The legal theory of the AT&T case and of the line-of-business
restrictions rested on two related monopolization theoriesmonopoly leveraging and the essential facilities doctrine. The
24. McKenna & Slyter, supra note 3, at 42-56.
25. Id. at 22-23.
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monopoly leveraging theory holds that a firm with monopoly
power in one market may not use that power to obtain a competitive advantage in a second market.2 Under the essential
facilities doctrine, a monopolist who controls a facility which its
competitors need to compete effectively has a general duty to
provide access to the facility on reasonable, non-discriminatory
terms.2 7
Though courts have articulated the requirements for proving
a monopolization offense under the two theories somewhat differently,28 a valid claim under either has at least two elements
in common. The first is that a firm possesses monopoly power
in a relevant market; second, that it has used that power unreasonably to restrain competition in a second market.' The US
WEST article thus challenges two essential elements of the
legal theory underlying both the AT&T case and the line-ofbusiness restrictions-that a separate local exchange market
exists and that there is monopoly power in that market.
It is true, as US WEST suggests, that many suppliers and customers view the telecommunications market as nationwide in
many respects. However, it also seems beyond serious dispute
that under the present economics and technology of the industry, there is a rationally segregable set of functions involving
the local switching and transmission of telecommunications in
3
which the market power of the BOCs may be analyzed. 0
26. See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); Berkey Photo, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
27. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983); Hecht v.
Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
28. Compare MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d
1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983), with Grason Elec. Co. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 571
F. Supp. 1504, 1518-19 (E.D. Cal. 1983).
29. In AT&T, the government charged that the Bell System had unlawfully used
the monopoly power of the BOCs' local exchange operations to disadvantage competitors in adjacent, related markets, principally by providing discriminatory access to
essential local exchange facilities and cross-subsidization of competitive services. The
divestiture of the BOCs from AT&T and the decree's line-of-business restrictions
were justified on the ground that only separation of ownership of monopoly local exchange services from the other potentially competitive businesses of the Bell System
could effectively prevent recurrence of the anticompetitive conduct alleged in AT&T.
See Competitive Impact Statement of the Department of Justice in Connection With
Proposed Modification of Final Judgment in Civil Action Nos. 74-1698 and 82-0192,
United States v. Western Elec. Co. (D.D.C.), reprinted in 47 Fed. Reg. 7170 (Feb. 17,
1982) [hereinafter Competitive Impact Statement].
30. Courts have frequently found the existence of relevant submarkets where the
service in question is'a subset of or input into an end to end or unitary service. See,
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The factual analysis underlying the Department's recom-

mendations, prepared by its consultant Peter Huber,31 for example, clearly supports the existence of such a relevant market
under present technology. Huber concludes that there are few,
if any, substitutess for the switched access provided by the
BOCs and relied on by the vast majority of their subscribers for
the origination and termination of interexchange calls.a3 Similarly, though substitutes exist, at least in theory, for large
users, there are practical limitations on the ability of carriers
and subscribers to substitute those alternatives for BOC-provided access.3 " These supply and demand characteristics of exchange access seem to clearly support continued reliance on
exchange services as a relevant market. It thus appears unlikely that the court will abandon the view that exchange services provide an appropriate framework for analysis of the

BOCs' market power.
For essentially the same reasons, the court will likely find
that the BOCs continue to possess substantial market power in
providing exchange access. The same lack of supply and demand substitutes for BOC-provided access that make such services an appropriate framework for market power analysis
suggest that significant market power continues to exist.3 5 As
to switched access, relied on by all but large business users, Hue.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); City of Mishawaka v.
America Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1980); Woods Exploration & Prod. Co.
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S. 1047
(1972); Town of Massena v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 1980-02 Trade Cas. (CCH)
63,526 (1980); Keystone Consolidated Indus., Inc. v. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co.,
No. 85-1386, slip op. (C.D. Ill. Jan. 9, 1987).
31. P. HUBER, THE GEODESIC NETwoRK, 1987 REPORT ON COMPETITION IN THE
TELEPHONE INDUSTRY [hereinafter Huber Report].
32. Relevant markets may be defined by reference to the existence or non-existence of substitutes for the product in question and, in particular, by the ability of
consumers and suppliers to substitute alternatives should a firm attempt to exercise
market power. The ability of consumers to shift to close substitutes in the face of a
price increase is referred to as the demand substitutability. The ability of producers
to shift production in response to a price increase is referred to as supply substitutability. See, e.g., United States Department of Justice Merger Guidelines at 3-5
(released June 14, 1984).
33. Huber Report, supra note 30, at 2.23.
34. Id. at 2.23 - 2.26.
35. The BOCs provide essentially two forms of exchange access to carriers:
switched access which makes use of both BOC switching and transmission facilities,
and unswitched, or special access, which make use of only BOC transmission facilities.
Because of the economics of traffic engineering, special access is generally only economic for high volumes of traffic from a particular location. Huber Report, supra note
30, at 2.23.
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ber found virtually no alternatives.6 Even as to those large
users for whom alternatives to BOC access at least theoretically
exist, 7 Huber found evidence of market power, for example, in
above-cost BOC pricing of short haul transmission services and
price discrimination between carriers and end users for the
same transmission services.38 More important, relying on the
Huber Report's findings, the Justice Department concluded in
its recommendations that "[u]ntil interexchange carriers can
obtain alternative means of access to a greater proportion of
customers, the local BOC is likely to retain significant bottleIn view
neck power with respect to interexchange services.'
find
that
court
will
that
the
of these findings, it seems unlikely
developments since divestiture have significantly eroded the
monopoly power of the BOCs' local exchange operations.

II
Incentive and Ability to Engage in
Anticompetitive Behavior
If the court finds that the BOCs continue to possess monopoly power, the next logical inquiry is whether, in the absence of
effective checks on that power, the BOCs would have the incentive and the ability to distort competition in related markets. Economic theory suggests that rate base-regulated
monopolists will have incentives to engage in monopolizing behavior in adjacent markets. 40 The predicted behavior of a rate
of return-regulated monopolist, as supported by the evidentiary
record of the AT&T case, was obviously a key element of the
government's arguments in support of divestiture and the lineof-business restrictions 41 and of the court's acceptance of the
36. Id. at 2.25.
37. Huber estimates that, for usage levels in the range of 10,000 to 100,000 minutes
of use per month, there are access alternatives that appear to be price competitive
with BOC unswitched access. Id. at 3.31.
38. Id. at 2.18 - 2.21.
39. DOJ Report, supra note 2, at 84.
40. See, e.g., D. Kelly, Deregulation After Divestiture: The Effect of the AT&T
Settlement on Competition 34-35 (Federal Communications Commission, OPP Working Paper Series Apr., 1982). A number of cases brought against AT&T predivestiture
rested on this theory. See, e.g., Southern Pacific Communications v. AT&T, 740 F.2d
980 (D.C. Cir. 1984); MCI Communicatons Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.
1983); Litton Sys., Inc. v. AT&T, 487 F. Supp. 942 (S.D. NY 1980); Jarvis, Inc. v. AT&T,
481 F. Supp. 120 (D.D.C. 1978).
41. Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 28, 47 Fed. Reg. at 7172-73.
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consent decree.4
It is not likely that the court would now reject that theory
and ignore the record developed in the case. The key question
presented by the DOJ Report, however, is not whether the
BOCs retain the incentives assumed by the adoption of the lineof-business restrictions, but whether, because of marketplace
or regulatory changes, there are means short of restricting entry (FCC regulation in particular) to effectively prevent conduct driven by those incentives, a subject to which the
discussion now turns.

III
Capacity of Government Regulation to Restrain
Monopoly Power
At the heart of the Justice Department's recommendations is
the premise that regulatory oversight and control can effectively replace the information services and manufacturing restrictions and, in part, the interexchange services restrictions.43
According to the Department, this change in view regarding
regulation results both from changes in the marketplace since
divestiture and from changes in the regulatory process."
A.

Information Services

The principal change since divestiture relevant to the information services restriction is the emergence and growth of a
variety of different services falling within the consent decree's
definition of information services. 45 The Department notes
that when the decree was "entered by the Court, most informa42. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 160-62.
43. It would be an oversimplification to say that the perceived efficacy of regulation was the sole basis for the Department's recommendations. Rather, the Department acknowledged some uncertainty on this point, but concluded that the costs of
restricting entry outweighed its benefits, even taking into account some uncertainty
as to the ability of regulatory mechanisms to prevent competitive abuses. See DOJ
Report, supra note 2, at 122-23.
44. Id. at 25-34, 111-21, 160-63.
45. Id. at 111-12. Information service is defined in the decree as:
the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming,
processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information which may
be conveyed via telecommunications, except that such service does not
include any use of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications service.
AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 229.
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tion services still were in a formative stage." When the information services restriction was adopted, therefore, the
"geographic and technical boundaries, the exact nature and future scope of information services were unclear, as was the dethey would depend on local telephone exchange
gree to which
47
facilities.

According to the Department, the various information services markets subsequently evolved differently from the way
most commentators had envisioned. While the implicit assumption underlying the restriction had been that most information services would be highly dependent on local exchange
interconnection, information services have turned out to vary
in the degree of their dependence on local exchange facilities.
Some services require no connection to the local exchange at
all," while others depend to a greater or lesser extent on interconnection or on the provision of special exchange functions.49
The competitive dangers of permitting the BOCs to provide information services is a function of the degree to which a BOC
could control the local exchange network to create artificial advantages for itself and artificial disadvantages for its competitors. The greatest potential for discrimination and crosssubsidization exists where a BOC, to take advantage of real or
artificial efficiencies, integrates the information service into its
network while denying others the same cost and technological
benefits.50
According to the DOJ Report, it is also with respect to such
services that the restriction may impose the most significant
costs by denying the public the benefits of such efficiencies the
BOCs would provide or, possibly, even of the service itself.51
Thus, the Department claims that the restriction covers services which vary significantly in the degree of competitive danger presented by BOC entry. The Report's discussion of these
services suggests that the competitive risk of entry varies directly with the potential public benefits of entry-the greatest
costs of restricting entry are incurred with respect to those
46. DOJ Report, supra note 2, at 108.
47. Id.
48. The decree does not restrict the BOCs from providing CPE, including computers, that are capable of providing information services. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at
229.
49. DOJ Report, supra note 2, at 106.
50. Id. at 122-23, 132.
51. Id. at 113-20.
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services which the BOCs are most likely to fully integrate into
their exchange networks. It is with respect to these services
that the difficulty of detecting and preventing discrimination
and cross-subsidization is greatest.
The DOJ Report rejects the notion that the restriction
should be dealt with on other than a fully inclusive basis. The
Report argues that attempting to distinguish among information services would involve a type of line drawing to which the
judiciary and an enforcement agency are ill-suited. 2 Instead,
the Department argues that the FCC, as the expert telecommunications agency, is better equipped than the district court to
perform such functions and has the means to address effectively the competitive issues raised by BOC entry.5 3 The Department points specifically to two recent FCC decisions as
evidence of the FCC's ability to address effectively competitive
issues-the Commission's Computer III requirement that the
BOCs implement ONA as a condition to providing enhanced
services without structural separation and the accounting rules
issued in the FCC's Joint Cost proceeding. 54
The DOJ's proposals' reliance on FCC regulation will likely
prove to be a critical focus of the court's inquiry. As both the
MCI and US WEST commentaries point out, regulation's inability to effectively address the problems posed by the integration of regulated monopoly and competitive activities within a
single firm was a key premise on which both divestiture and
the line-of-business restrictions proceeded.5
That central
premise of the AT&T case was supported by the factual episodes of the government's case, testimony by expert economic
s To achieve
witnesses, and testimony of former FCC officialsM
the relief it seeks, therefore, the Department will have to overcome the presumption on the part of the court that regulation
is not likely to prevent the abuses to which the restriction is
addressed.
One of the difficulties the Department will encounter in
meeting this probable burden is that the chief regulatory mea52. Id. at 134-36.
53. Id. at 137-46.
54. Id. See supra note 22; Separation of Costs of Regulated Telephone Service
from Costs of Nonregulated Activities, Report and Order in Docket No. 86-111, FCC
86-564 (released Feb. 6, 1987).
55. Worthington, supra note 3, at 78-79. McKenna & Slyter, supra note 3, at 2427.
56. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 168.
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sure it relies on to prevent discrimination is the FCC's recently
adopted ONA requirement.5 7 As the Department acknowledges, however, ONA has yet to be fully defined, much less implemented by the BOCs. It is less than clear that the court will
be willing to entirely lift the information services restrictions
on the basis of an adopted, but not yet defined and not yet implemented exchange access regime for information services
providers.5
As discussed, the FCC has released the results of its Joint
Cost proceeding on which the Department relies as a means of
preventing cross-subsidization. Here again, however, the Department will probably face a difficult burden in persuading
the court that its prior position-that anticompetitive crosssubsidies cannot be prevented by accounting rules-is now essentially incorrect.59 The Department's effort in this task will
not be aided by the findings of its own consultant who describes
the allocation of common costs, inter alia,as a "mysterious and
fundamentally arbitrary process." 6 Though the Huber Report
finds some reason to hope that accounting rules could prevent
anticompetitive cost shifting, it concludes that the likelihood of
61
success of the FCC's new rules "is impossible to predict."'
In the end, the court's resolution of the issues posed by the
Department's information services recommendation will likely
reflect a balance of the competitive risks, conceded as such
even by the Department, against the potential benefits of permitting entry. Probably the most difficult hurdle faced by the
proponents of lifting the restriction will be convincing the court
that regulation, the failure of which was an important foundation for the decree in the first place, is now capable of effectively safeguarding competitive concerns. That burden may be
eased, however, if the court is persuaded that the effect of
prohibiting BOC entry has been to deny the public the benefits
of important efficiencies or services that otherwise would have
been available.
57. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.

58. In the absence of ONA, the BOCs would be required to provide information
services through separate subsidiaries under the Computer II rules. See 47 C.F.R.
§ 64.702 (1985).
59. Response of United States, 47 Fed. Reg. at 23,336.
60. Huber Report, supra note 30, at 6.38.
61. Id. at 6.39.
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B.

Manufacturing Restriction

As discussed above, the DOJ Report also recommends removing all restrictions on the BOCs' ability to manufacture
communications equipment. Here again, the Department relies
on new information, industry changes and regulation's ability
to prevent anticompetitive conduct, to support its position that
the restriction has become unnecessary.
The principal new information and industry changes relied
on by the Department are: (1) the insights gained from the initial consent decree modification permitting the BOCs to provide, but not manufacture, customer premises equipment
(CPE);62 (2) a trend toward consolidation among manufacturers
of sophisticated network equipment, suggesting a substantial
minimum efficient size for the manufacture of telecommunications equipment; and (3) the divestiture itself, which created
seven substantial purchasers of equipment, where previously
there had been only one."
The first of these,'experience gained in BOC provision of
CPE, relates primarily to the issue of BOC manufacture of
CPE. As originally proposed to the court, the consent decree
would have prohibited this activity.'5 The Justice Department
argued against allowing the BOCs to provide CPE (particularly
complex CPE such as PBXs) on the ground that the BOCs
would retain significant ability to disrupt competition in that
market. 6 The court rejected this argument and required that
the decree be modified to permit BOC provision (though not
manufacture) of CPE.67 According to the DOJ report, experience in BOC provision of CPE since divestiture suggests that
the Department's earlier fears have not been realized. 8 The
Department further argues that the opportunities for competitive mischief are not substantially greater with respect to manufacturing than they are with respect to the sale of CPE. Thus,
most of the competitive risks of permitting BOC manufacture
62. DOJ Report, supra note 2, at 193, 198-99.

63. Id. at 175.
64. Id. at 176.
65. Id. at 193-94.
66. Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Court's Opinion of August 11, 1982 (filed Aug. 19, 1982) United States v. Western Elec. Co., Civil Action No.

82-0192 (D.D.C.).
67. United States v. Western Elec., Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 190-99 (D.D.C. 1982).

68. DOJ Report, supra note 2, at 198.
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of CPE have already been incurred.69
The argument in support of permitting BOC manufacture of
network equipment is somewhat more involved. The Department begins with the premise that if a BOC procured all of its
requirements from an affiliate, even when better, less expensive alternatives were available, such conduct would present
regulatory, but not antitrust concerns. 70 Given this premise,
the Department limits its inquiry to potential anticompetitive
effects in the broader U.S. market for telecommunications
equipment.
According to the Department, the recent trend toward consolidation of manufacturers of sophisticated, capital intensive
equipment suggests that the minimum efficient size of operation is quite large-probably larger than an entire BOC's demand for such products. 71 Assuming this is true, an equipmentmanufacturing BOC (either by de novo entry or through a joint
venture) could not sustain the necessary capital expenditures
to operate efficiently if it confined its activities to self-supply. 72
While a BOC in that position would have an incentive to capture market share by overcharging its telephone operating
affiliates for equipment, by cross-subsidizing design and development, or by other means, the Department argues that regulators would be able to detect such behavior and take corrective
action.73 The existence of seven large purchasers would pro4
vide benchmarks which would aid them in this task.7
Several aspects of this analysis will no doubt invite the
court's critical attention. For example, the Department's argument that most of the risks of BOC manufacture have already
been incurred is at odds with the court's explicit finding that
the competitive risks of manufacture are significantly greater
69. Id. at 204.
70. Id. at 48-49, 174-75. Regulatory concerns include the possibility that regulated
rates will be inflated by inter-affiliate sales of equipment.
71. Id,at 175-76.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 176-77.
74. Id. Prior to divestiture, the ability of regulators to detect cross-subsidization
and other forms of undesirable behavior was inhibited by the existence of essentially
a single large enterprise which controlled much or all of the information relevant to
the regulator's job. Divestiture, inter alia, dispersed control of such information
among seven firms and also created the possibility of diversity in service offerings,
pricing practices and the like. Thus, the behavior of each of the BOCs may now be
compared to at least six "benchmarks."
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than the risks presented solely by provision of CPE.7 5 Further,
the Department's observation that BOC provision of CPE has
not visibly disrupted competition might confirm for the court
the correctness of its decison to permit CPE provision, but be
deemed to have little bearing on the question of the competitive risks of manufacture.
The most controversial aspect of the Department's recommendation with respect to network equipment is probably the
Department's opening premise: that supply of 100 percent of
its equipment needs by a BOC, even if achieved by exclusionary
means, would present no significant competitive issues. The rationale for this position is that since no BOC controls more
than approximately fifteen percent of the overall U.S. market
for equipment, a single BOC purchasing all of its requirements
from an affiliated manufacturer would not, by itself, threaten
competition in the remainder of the market.7 6
While this latter proposition is arguably correct (as qualified),7 7 the conclusion in support of which it is advanced seems
at odds with the Department's legal theory in the AT&T casea theory accepted by the court as accurately describing the law
of monopolization.
In presenting its case, the Department argued that the Sherman Act forbids a firm with monopoly power from using that
power to obtain unwarranted competitive advantages in another market, even in the absence of an attempt to monopolize
the second market. 7 The Department also took the position
that evasion of profit regulation by affiliate overcharges to regulated companies harms consumer welfare and is a matter of
antitrust concern.7 9 In view of the court's acceptance of these
75. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 190-92.
76. DOJ Report, supra note 2, at 176.
77. Even monopolization of its own internal demand for equipment by a single
BOC could in some circumstances affect competition in the broader U.S. market and
the ability of U.S. firms to compete in foreign markets, if the reduction in demand for
non-BOC manufactured equipment were sufficient to cause U.S. firms to lose efficient
scale of operation. If multiple BOCs engaged in such conduct, existing U.S. firms
might be unable to retain a sufficient scale to compete effectively.
78. See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Involuntary Dismissal Under Rule 41(b) at 363 (filed Aug. 16, 1981) United States v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336 (D.D.C. 1981) (No. 74-1698).
79. See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1373-74
(D.C.C. 1981). See also Trial Transcript at 11, 305-77, United States v. American Tel.
& Tel. Co., No. 74-1698 (D.D.C. 1981) (testimony of F.R. Warren-Boulton) (June 25,
1981).
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arguments, the Department may find it difficult to persuade
the court that there are no competitive concerns associated
with BOC manufacture of equipment-particularly the Department's supposition that lifting the restriction would lead to 100
percent self supply by at least some BOCs.
As discussed above, the Department would also rely on regulatory mechanisms to detect and prevent anticompetitive conduct by a manufacturing BOC.° The Department argues that
the FCC's new accounting rules and the seven BOCs serving as
benchmarks will assist regulators in detecting anticompetitive
behavior."' Here again, however, the Department will have to
contend with its prior position on accounting rules and with its
consultant's findings. A central thesis of the Department's case
was that accounting rules, no matter how carefully devised, are
not an effective safeguard against cross-subsidies.82 Further,
while the seven "benchmarks" clearly facilitate regulation in
important ways, the Huber Report concluded that such benchmark competition would not greatly aid regulators in ensuring
that a manufacturing BOC procure only the best and least expensive equipment, regardless of source."
Thus, as with the information services restriction, the Department may find it difficult to persuade the court that regulation is an effective substitute for the decree's prohibitions. For
information services, the court may be more willing to accept
the risk that regulation will not fully safeguard competition if
it is persuaded that retaining the restriction would deny the
public certain information services or important efficiencies80. See supra note 22.
81. DOJ Report, supra note 2, at 265.
82. See Response of United States, 47 Fed. Reg. at 23,336.

83. In response to the question of how local exchange carriers can evade effective
regulatory oversight of equipment procurement, the Huber Report states:
LECs [local exchange carriers] may, of course, set the specification for the
equipment they wish to buy, and no regulator can readily second guess specifications which happen to match those of an affiliated manufacturer. And
more than coincidence may be at work. Any preferred or advance information about a LEC's network plans, or past operating experience, or future
technical specifications, will give its affiliate a substantial edge over competing suppliers. In short, regulatory requirements that LECs buy equipment
competitively crumble quickly when the product being purchased is technically complex and readily differentiated. More fundamentally, the LECO-affiliated manufacturer may well become low-cost producer to the best
equipment simply by virtue of its preferential access to competitively valuable information that the LECs collect and generate.
Huber Report, supra note 30, at 14.13.
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costs not anticipated in the decree. Although the Department
argues that the manufacturing restriction may result in foregone efficiencies, 4 it does not suggest that preventing the BOCs
from engaging in manufacturing is any less efficient than was
at least implicitly accepted at the time the decree was entered.
Any such foregone efficiencies were then considered the
necesssary price for the competitive benefits expected to flow
from divestiture and from the manufacturing restriction.
C.

Interexchange Services Restriction

The DOJ Report recommends immediately lifting only a portion of the interexchange services restriction; a BOC would be
permitted to provide only interexchange services that do not
originate or terminate in its territory."5 The restriction would
be entirely lifted only if state regulators removed all barriers to
competition at the local exchange level, permitted unlimited
resale and sharing of exchange services, removed discriminatory pricing of exchange services, and granted access by BOC
competitors to the local exchange infrastructure (e.g., poles and
conduits).
The basic rationale of the out-of-region recommendation is
that a BOC would have no ability to use its control of bottleneck facilities to discriminate directly against its out-of-region
competitors.8 7 While this observation seems largely correct,
there are a number of other possible avenues for potential anticompetitive conduct that the court will undoubtedly want to
ensure are sufficiently foreclosed by other means. For example, out-of-region services clearly present fewer opportunities
for cross-subsidization than in-region interexchange services.
However, the BOCs could at least theoretically affect subsidies
by shifting costs of common administrative, marketing, or other
personnel, and of research and development common to both
exchange and interexchange services.
Though the court will likely view these matters as important
subjects of inquiry, the Department's recommendation poses a
more fundamental question: whether there is a market for a
service that is not ubiquitous, at least at the terminating end.
While a number of firms offer originating interexchange serv84. DOJ Report, supra note 2, at 182.

85. Id. at 59-60.
86. Id. at 97-101.
87. Id. at 71-77.
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ices that are geographically limited, it seems almost certain
that most, if not all, such firms offer ubiquitous terminating
service through resale of other carrier's services." If there is
not a viable market for out-of-region interexchange services,
the Department's recommendation could be viewed as having
little immediate significance.
On the other hand, it might (and probably will) be argued
that even this limited recommendation presents risks sufficient
to prevent its adoption by the court. For example, prohibiting
in-region termination of interexchange calls would present
difficult enforcement problems. It may not be possible in some
circumstances for even a BOC to ensure that calls that originate on its interexchange network do not terminate within
its territory. It would be even more difficult for the Justice
Department, which would be responsible for enforcing the
limitation, to ensure that the limitation is not breached. Further, the court has been reluctant to permit the BOCs to
engage in activities that verged on prohibited interexchange
services, on the ground that to do so would create opportunities
for incrementally whittling away the restriction."9 This same
concern might apply to the Department's out-of-region recommendation.
The Department's complementary recommendation, that the
in-region restriction be lifted when certain conditions are satisfied, is also likely to meet with some skepticism, not only by the
court, but by state regulators as well. As previously discussed,
the Department would recommend lifting the restriction entirely if the state commissions, interalia,eliminated all restrictions on competition at the local level, permitted unlimited
resale and sharing of exchange services, and removed non-costrelated pricing disparities.'
Broadly read, the Department proposes a revolution in the
88. MCI originally entered the interexchange market providing point-to-point

private line service, a service that would be permitted to the BOCs under the Department's recommendations. MCI quickly found, however, that because of substantial
economics in the aggregation of traffic, such a limited offering was not sustainable.
These factors led MCI to expand into private network services and ultimately into

ubiquitous MTS-like services. Special Common Carrier Services, First Report and
Order, 29 F.C.C. 2d 876 (1971), affd sub nora. Washington UtiL & Transp. v. FCC, 513
F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1976); MCI Telecommunications
Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365, 368-69 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978).
89. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 627 F. Supp. 1090, 1097 n.25 (D.D.C. 1986),
rev'd in part, 797 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
90. DOJ Report, supra note 2, at 97-103.
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way exchange services are offered and priced. Many state commissions are likely to object both to the substance of the conditions and, on principle, to the idea that the court should use its
authority under an antitrust decree to coerce state action that
could affect what are regarded as important social policies.
The court will probably focus on the practical likelihood that
removing barriers to entry at the local exchange level will
change the fundamental characteristics of the local exchange.
The Department itself does not claim that removing entry restrictions would mean an end to BOC monopoly power.9 1 Further, the Huber Report suggests that the economics of traffic
engineering at the exchange level are such that, even for unswitched forms of exchange access, the BOCs may realize suffi92
cient economies of scale to realize natural monopoly power.
Thus, while removal of entry restrictions would probably reduce the ability of the BOCs to disadvantage interexchange
competitors, it would be unlikely to either significantly affect
the basic economics of exchange services which make the BOCs
the low cost providers of most such services, or remove all potential avenues of discriminatory conduct.
In sum, the Department's recommendations rest largely on a
significantly more optimistic view of regulation's capacity to
prevent anticompetitive conduct than the view expressed when
the decree was entered. Whether the relief requested by the
Department is granted will depend both on the court's willingness to accept the view that changes since divestiture have enhanced the ability of regulation to detect and prevent
anticompetitive conduct and, as discussed below, its evaluation
of the likely costs and benefits of lifting the restrictions in view
of such changes.

IV
Costs and Benefits
The consent decree's line-of-business restrictions reflect a
balance of the perceived costs of restricting entry against its
perceived benefits. At the time the decree was first tendered to
the court, the Justice Department advanced a "strict quarantine" theory to support the scope of the restrictions as then proposed. The Department argued that the dangers of permitting
91. Id. at 97.
92. Huber Report, supra note 30, at 2.20.
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the BOCs, as rate base-regulated monopolists, to participate in
competitive markets were sufficiently great to warrant confinement of the BOCs to exchange telecommunications functions,
until their monopoly power had significantly eroded.'3 Implicit
in this approach was the notion that the costs of restricting entry would always be outweighed by the costs of permitting
entry.
The district court, though appreciating the conceptual consistency of this approach, concluded that the blanket ban on entry
advocated by the Department failed "to take account of circumstances far more complex than [the restrictions as proposed] acknowledge."" The court thus required the parties to agree to
several modifications to the decree, including provisions permitting the BOCs to provide CPE and directory advertising,
and Section VIII(C) of the decree, which provides for waivers
of the restrictions in cases where there is "no substantial possibility" that a BOC "could use its monopoly power to impede
competition in the market it seeks to enter. ' 95 While the court
has granted waivers liberally under the section VIII(C) standard for non-exchange dependent businesses, it has essentially
adopted one aspect of the Department's strict quarantine theory: removal of the decree's core restrictions (interexchange
services, information services and. manufacturing) should not
be granted until the BOCs have lost their local exchange
monopoly.96

The recommendations of the DOJ Report reflect yet another
mode of cost/benefit analysis. The results of this version seem
attributable mainly to the weight given to two principal factors
in the analysis-the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct without the restrictions, and the costs of retaining the restrictions.
As to the former, the Department concedes that the market
power of the BOCs and their incentives to use that power to
impede competition have not changed significantly since divestiture.97 What has changed, according to the Department, is regulation's ability to effectively check the anticompetitive
exercise of that power. As suggested earlier, the Department's
93. See Brief of the United States in Response to the Court's Memorandum of
May 25, 1982 at 29-32 (filed June 14, 1982) AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982).
94. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 187.
95. MFJ, 552 F. Supp. at 231.
96. See, e.g., United States v. Western Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 846, 868 (D.D.C.
1984), appeal dismissed, 777 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
97. DOJ Report, supra note 2, at 42-43.
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toughest burden of persuasion will likely be to convince the
court that this is indeed the case.
On the other side of the balance, the Department's strongest
case supporting the proposition that the costs of the restrictions
now outweigh their benefits seems to be with respect to information services. To the extent that the restriction has effectively denied customers the benefit of new services or
important efficiencies, the Department is in a stronger position
to argue for removal or modification of the restriction, even if
doubts remain regarding the capacity of regulation to fully safeguard competitive interests.
On the basis of the Department's Report, the benefit side of
the ledger seems weaker with respect to interexchange services
and manufacturing. For example, with respect to manufacturing, the Department argues that removal of the restriction
might permit the BOCs to realize potential economies of inhouse production and make faster introduction of new technology possible. The Department also suggests that the mere entry of the BOCs as additional competitors might produce
benefits." All of those arguments, however, were repeatedly
made to the district court by AT&T during the trial?9 Further,
any efficiencies in fact foregone are not likely to be any different in kind or magnitude than those associated with the divestiture itself, a sacrifice that was at least implicitly accepted as the
price for the competitive benefits the decree was expected to
provide.
As to interexchange services, the DOJ Report does not explicitly identify any benefits that would be gained by BOC entry, although implicit in the recommendation is the belief that
entry of additional competitors would provide a competitive
benefit. Again, though, it was expressly recognized by both the
Department and the court before the decree was entered that
entry restrictions are generally anti-competitive.1°° A basic assumption of the line-of-business restrictions, however, was that
any benefit derived by the entry of the BOCs as additional com98. Id. While the Department did not raise the possible effects of BOC manufacturing on the U.S. trade position, some parties will undoubtedly argue that the restrictions hinder U.S. competitiveness. Still others will likely take the opposite position.
99. See, e.g., Defendants' Third Statement of Contentions and Proof, Vol. III, at
2120-36, (filed Mar. 10, 1980) United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. (D.D.C.) (No.
74-1698).
100. Response of United States, 47 Fed. Reg. at 23,336; AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 18687.
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petitors would be outweighed by the anticompetitive potential
inherent in BOC control of bottleneck facilities.10 '
Thus, the Department's argument that removing restrictions
on the BOCs will produce benefits unanticipated at the time of
divestiture seems to be strongest with respect to information
services. If, as the Department contends, the inability of the
BOCs to provide such services has denied the public important
benefits, that cost of restriction will clearly be an important element in the court's consideration of the Department's recommendations. On the other hand, the DOJ Report does not
appear to identify costs associated with manufacturing and interexchange services restrictions that are not of a kind and
magnitude, at least implicitly, already taken into account by the
court in approving the decree. The fate of the Department's
recommendations as to these restrictions would seem to depend
largely on the Department's ability to convince the court that
changes since divestiture have substantially attenuated the
competitive dangers that the restrictions were intended to
address.

V
Conclusion
The Justice Department's submission of its line-of-business
recommendations to the decree court has dramatically shifted
the debate, at least temporarily, from a legislative to a judicial
forum. While the ostensible purpose of the Dole Bill was
merely the transfer of jurisdiction to avoid unnecessary overlap, it was widely regarded as a device to facilitate freeing the
BOCs from the consent decree's restrictions. It is not surprising, therefore, as the US WEST and MCI articles indicate, that
the debate before Congress and the decree court has focused, in
large measure, on the same questions.
One significant difference between the two forums, however,
is the decisional rules which govern the treatment of issues
presented to each forum for consideration. Congress is constrained only by the reach of its constitutional authority and is
not subject to material limitation in the scope of considerations
which may influence its collective judgment.
The decree court is subject to more severe limitations-those
contained in the decree itself. Thus, the court may not act in101. Response of United States, 47 Fed. Reg. at 23,336-37.
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consistently with the standards the decree imposes, informed in
its application of those standards by the record and by its experience in overseeing the judgment. 0 2 This more limited scope
of review suggests that the court will neither reject the basic
premises of the decree as the US WEST article argues nor
adopt the absolute position advocated by MCI. Instead, the
court will likely perform an analysis similar to that which led it
to require modification of the decree before it was entered-a
market specific analysis of the competitive dangers posed by
BOC entry. As the preceding discussion suggests, the outcome
of that analysis will depend largely on the willingness of the
court to accept the Department's position that regulation is
now capable of performing, to a degree, the functions the Department once argued to be beyond its inherent capabilities.
While it is impossible to predict the result of the court's analysis, it seems clear that the outcome will determine whether the
shift of attention from Congress to the decree court is, indeed,
only temporary.*

102. See United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 719 F.2d 558 (2d Cir. 1983), cert
denied, 465 U.S. 1101 (1984).
*

EDITOR'S ADDENDUM

In September of 1987, the District Court for the District of Columbia, reconsidered
the line-of-business restrictions on the regional Bell holding companies spun off from
AT&T. US v. Western Electric Co., Inc., 82-0192 (filed Sept. 10, 1987). The Court
concluded that in the three years since imposition of the consent decree no significant
changes had occurred with respect to the "core restrictions;" that is, restrictions on
the regional holding companies which prohibited them from making telecommunications equipment, providing long distance service and selling information services.
The court ordered the removal of two other, non-core, restrictions because it felt it
would "yield significant benefits without serious risk of harm to competition." US v.
Western Electric at 219. The court repealed the restrictions on the entry of regional
Bell holding companies into non-telecommunications markets. Secondly, the court
distinguished between the restrictions on generating information services content,
which the court continued to prohibit as a core restriction, and the transmission of
information services which the court opened the door for the regional Bell holding
companies to provide. This means that the regional holding companies can now transmit such electronic information services as message storing, alarm monitoring, home
banking and events ticketing over their telephone networks.

